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From Guilt to Shame:  
Albert Camus and Literature’s 
Ethical Response to Politics
❦
Daniel Just
The concept of shame in Western discourse has often carried a lesser 
moral significance than guilt. Unlike guilt that pertains to one’s 
actions and intentions, shame relates to one’s affects and emotions. 
While guilt is of an essentially mimetic and identificatory nature, 
the logic that underlies shame is of a specular kind: the experience 
of shame depends on the awareness of being exposed to a shaming 
gaze, and therefore on the consciousness of an autonomous self that 
is not immersed in the interpersonal dynamic to the same extent as 
the guilty self. Although shame is clearly not without ties to action 
because it is mostly experienced as an immediate consequence of 
one’s deeds, the feeling of shame indicates both a shortcoming in 
behavior and a flaw in personality. One can, indeed, experience shame 
as a product of faulty conduct but unlike embarrassment or regret 
shame touches one on a deeper existential level, and even though it 
does not necessarily reveal a real personality flaw it always implies self-
questioning. As Ruth Leys has recently put it, whereas “guilt concerns 
your actions, that is, what you do, or what you wish or fantasize you 
have done,” “shame is held to concern not your actions but who you 
are, that is, your deficiencies and inadequacies as a person as these 
are revealed to the shaming gaze of the other.”1 According to this 
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conceptual convention, a product of a long tradition in psychoanalysis 
and psychology—Leys’s principal references include Sigmund Freud, 
Sandor Ferenczi, Anna Freud, Silvian Tomkins, Donald Nathanson, 
Paul Ekman, and Carroll Izard, but one could add a parallel tradition 
in phenomenology and existentialism from Max Scheler to Jean-Paul 
Sartre—shame is secondary to guilt in terms of morality and ethics 
because it is too entangled in the struggle for recognition, and thus 
too much absorbed in the self rather than the other. 
The ethical relevance of guilt and shame becomes more ambigu-
ous once these concepts are applied in historically complex, ethically 
challenging and morally troublesome situations and events. It becomes 
questionable, for example, to explain phenomena such as survivor’s 
guilt by principles that have been traditionally associated with the 
notion of guilt (in particular, the logic of complicity and regressive 
identification with the aggressor or the original traumatic scene). 
So much so that Giorgio Agamben has made a plea against the very 
concept of the survivor’s guilt, arguing that the reaction of those who 
returned from concentration camps, feeling guilty that it was they 
who survived and not someone else, be seen as an inability—quite 
an understandable one, he adds, given the extreme circumstances—
to deal with one’s feeling of shame.2 What exactly, then, asking after 
Agamben and beyond the academic discipline of trauma studies, are 
the ethical and political stakes at play in the shift of emphasis from 
guilt to shame? Moreover, since most theoretical conclusions about 
guilt and shame have been made about and from the perspective of 
the victim, how would the ethical and political concerns at work in this 
shift reflect the change of focus from the victim to situations where 
one was a silent accomplice (e.g., the gray majority during Nazism 
and Communism), or where the boundary between the victim and 
the perpetrator is hopelessly complex (e.g., different groups justify-
ing and enforcing their rights over the same land), or where one 
does not perceive oneself as perpetrator but is perceived as one (e.g., 
descendants of colonizers born, and at home, in colonies fighting for 
independence)?
The last case is that of Albert Camus, the story of whose controversial 
political views during the Algerian war has been widely debated and is 
well known by now: a pied noir, a Frenchman born in Algeria, Camus 
saw himself as an Algerian and throughout the 1950s argued against 
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Algerian independence because he feared it would lead to the expul-
sion of people, cultures and values deemed foreign but considered 
by Camus intrinsic to the diverse fabric of Algeria. Although Camus 
carefully avoided taking sides, his stance implied a conservative posi-
tion of preserving the current state of Algeria as part of France that, 
both then and now, meant a deplorable opposition to the historical 
process of decolonization. In response to challenges to this position, 
Camus drew attention to violence. In L’Homme révolté (1951) he already 
argued that terror—both the real violence and the violence of “une 
subjectivité interminable qui s’impose aux autres comme objectivité”3—
is inadmissible as a principle of political action, and during the war he 
criticized the emphasis on history and historical progress, espoused 
most notably by Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon, as an excuse to 
justify violence in the name of political messianism and philosophical 
Manicheism. After his arguments against violence were dismissed as 
an a-political moralism, Camus, wary of fueling both the discursive 
and the actual violence, turned to literature to explicate his ethical 
and political vision. La Chute (1956) and L’Exil et le royaume (1957), 
the last literary texts published during his life, returned not only to 
L’Homme révolté to recast its call for dialogue but also to the themes 
of guilt and shame present in Camus’s fiction since L’Étranger (1942). 
In these narratives from the early stages of the Algerian war—that is, 
a time when Camus still hoped for a peaceful coexistence before the 
escalation of violence increased his despair, inciting his withdrawal 
and work on the autobiographic and heavily nostalgic novel Le Premier 
Homme—guilt and shame marked the troubled rapport between ethics 
and politics, as well as literary figurations of their reconciliation. 
When La Chute came out in 1956, Maurice Blanchot immediately 
hailed it as a narrative of metaphysical self-interrogation and disobe-
dience. The novella concerns a Parisian lawyer, a self-proclaimed 
defender of the wretched, Jean-Baptiste Clamence, who, after realizing 
the hypocrisy of his humanistic behavior when he failed to help a 
drowning woman, settles in Amsterdam and spends his days recounting 
his story of guilt to strangers. In Blanchot’s reading, La Chute becomes a 
tale of existential “lucidité.”4 Like Oedipus, Blanchot argues, Clamence 
has fallen because he was too close to truth, courageously leaving for an 
exile in which he would not have to live “quiètement et hypocritement” 
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(232). Interestingly enough, Blanchot does not pay much attention to 
the context and the specifics of Clamence’s continuous flow of self-
reproaches. The fact that the conversation with the unknown traveler 
is in fact a monologue is, in Blanchot’s comparison of Clamence to 
Oedipus’s “dialogue solitaire” with the silent company of gods (228), 
not Clamence’s fault: Clamence’s speech falls into unreality only on 
account of his interlocutor’s vagueness and immobility. The rationale 
of “La Chute: la fuite” is unmistakable: Blanchot reads this récit as an 
enactment of the argument from L’Homme révolté, interpreting it as a 
story of revolt against the exile of the human race in the world. 
Although the affinity between La Chute and L’Homme révolté is undeni-
able, Blanchot’s metaphysical argument comes at the expense of the 
political case against monologues. In the oft-quoted statement that 
denounces monologues as manifestations of violence, Camus famously 
remarked that “le dialogue, relation des personnes, a été remplacé 
par la propagande ou la polémique, qui sont deux sortes de mono-
logue.”5 Considering the prominence of guilt in La Chute, as well as 
the effect on this narrative of the notorious Sartre-Camus controversy 
regarding L’Homme révolté, La Chute certainly tried to do more than 
merely exemplify the logic of revolt. As Debarati Sanyal demonstrated, 
La Chute stages and responds to the critique of L’Homme révolté by 
performing the kind of totalizing approach previously criticized as 
the logic of mastery that leads to terror.6 In other words, Clamence’s 
confessional monologue shows not only that the seemingly virtuous 
bourgeois lifestyle is far from innocent and that the private revolt is 
inconsolable, but also that what lacks in dialogue and abounds with 
aggression is the self-punitive confession of guilt as much as the overt 
propaganda.
In La Chute, the boundary between admiration and shame, virtue 
and vice, pride and guilt is very thin indeed. It is Clamence himself 
who, after walking away from the cries of the drowning woman, 
draws attention to this liminality. He realizes that as a lawyer he was 
helping others only in safe situations in which he could be admired 
for his honorable behavior, and that he needed and cherished the 
wretchedness of others. Like Saint Augustine, who reports a similar, 
if even more ingenuous, fondness for the suffering of others, and 
whose Confessiones Camus read on a number of occasions, Clamence 
admits that he did not want to eradicate injustices, for they allowed 
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him to be popular and to feel good about himself. As Camus sug-
gests, Clamence romanticized and over-identified with the misery of 
others—a sign of self-involvement rather than openness to others.7 
After this realization, Clamence curiously decides to go to Amsterdam 
instead of either staying in Paris and repenting or running far away. By 
choosing Amsterdam, which the text presents as a replica of Paris—
with the canals replacing the Seine and the scandalous deportation of 
Jews the drowning woman—Clamence decides to remember the past 
and examine the self-centeredness of his former life, but to do so in a 
semi-detached fashion. In the cultural familiarity and yet geographi-
cal distance of Amsterdam, Clamence’s atonement turns into a mere 
diatribe of self-accusations. What Clamence practiced as an honorable 
behavior for his sympathetic witnesses in Paris he now performs in 
the form of self-derogatory monologues for his quiet companions in 
Amsterdam. Like the Parisian intellectuals whom he condemns as 
“des juges pénitents” for reproaching themselves only so that they 
could attack someone else, he now accuses himself as well in order 
to justify his judgment of others. Turning Clamence into just another 
remorseful judge, La Chute unfolds a complex system of identification 
and disidentification that mimics the logic of non-oppositionality 
between admiration and shame, virtue and vice, and pride and guilt. 
Not only is Clamence’s self-accusation inextricably bound with the 
accusation of others but his repentance repeats the same selfishness 
that governed his previous life in Paris. 
With guilt appearing in a variety of forms in La Chute, it is not sim-
ply a question of whether Clamence is responsible for his actions or 
whether his guilty feelings are the appropriate response to the event 
of drowning; it is equally a question of whether his enactment of guilt 
does justice to the ethical implications that the notion of guilt, as 
Camus posits it, entails. Blanchot, for example, when he returned to 
La Chute after Camus’s death, tried to exonerate Clamence, arguing 
that he cannot be held responsible because, if he is guilty at all, his 
fault “ne se situe pas au niveau de l’âme, mais du corps.”8 As in “La 
Chute: la fuite,” here as well Blanchot downplays the event of drown-
ing into a secondary accident, one among others in Clamence’s life 
of revolt, and speculates that unlike Clamence who is a city-dweller 
and thus naturally afraid of the cold water, Meursault, with his “jeune 
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vigueur” (ibid.), would have saved the woman.9 In her seminal study 
of La Chute, Shoshana Felman shifts the emphasis from the question 
of Clamence’s accountability for his actions to the question of his 
experience of the event. Following her hypothesis that certain events 
disrupt the ability of those who undergo them to bear witness, while 
at the same time exposing them to the unconscious compulsion to 
return to these events, Felman interprets Clamence’s failure to recall 
the event as a protective shielding from its trauma. For Felman, La 
Chute is a narrative stylization of what she calls a “missed encounter 
with reality” because the event this story is built around enters Cla-
mence’s speech only “in so far as it is not experienced, in so far as it is 
literally missed.”10 Although Felman makes a convincing case that by 
staging Clamence’s failure to bear witness, La Chute turns its readers 
into Clamence’s silent interlocutors, and thus paradoxically succeeds 
in figuring the event, Clamence does not seem as traumatized as Fel-
man asserts. 
Felman’s reading disregards Camus’s irony and its place in his late 
work. Oscillating between confessing his guilt and undermining it 
through ironies, identifications and disidentifications, Clamence often 
relates to the events that traumatized him lucidly and occasionally with 
a sense of impudence. After the lamentation “‘O jeune fille, jette-toi 
encore dans l’eau pour que j’aie une seconde fois la chance de nous 
sauver tous les deux!” for example, he teasingly adds that fortunately 
it is too late for this, as he would not want to enter the cold water.11 
Or, similarly, when at the beginning he guides his companion to the 
hotel, he stops in front of the bridge saying that he never goes fur-
ther because, should someone jump into the water, he would either 
have to fish him out, which is a great risk “dans la saison froide,” or 
leave him there, which can cause one “étranges courbatures” (19). 
With his witty and playful self-reproaches, Clamence is, as Dominick 
LaCapra points out, far from a bystander and a victim of trauma.12 
Clamence enjoys his eloquence, constantly drawing attention to the 
thematic sophistication and rhetorical playfulness of his speech. And 
yet, while this display of sophistication is very seductive, turning both 
Clamence’s interlocutor and the reader of La Chute into his accom-
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plices—which depending on the perspective could be interpreted 
with Felman as an ethical device in the service of witnessing, or with 
Colin Davis as a narrative act of domination that extends Clamence’s 
violent monologue13—it is clear that at least on some level the reader 
and the interlocutor do not comply. In fact, the reader is frequently 
reminded to resist Clamence’s seductiveness and not to acquiesce to 
his discourse. With Clamence’s often ironic and always highly self-
conscious speech—“Moi, moi, moi, voilà le refrain de ma chère vie” 
(53)—the act of domination on which the narrative principle of La 
Chute rests is never hidden and can thus hardly be an act of effective 
domination or an innocent staging of witnessing.
The central place of guilt in La Chute is determined both by the 
logic of terror, violence and selfishness borrowed from L’Homme révolté, 
and by the prominent role of irony in La Chute. Clamence’s guilt suc-
cessfully brings both sides together as it, on the one hand, ironically 
embodies Sartre’s critique of Camus’s fear of history—which Sartre 
memorably framed as the fear of entering the waters of history and 
merely testing them with a finger—and, on the other hand, deliber-
ately plays on the mechanism of perpetuating guilt. This mechanism, 
Clamence declares, is the foundation of our culture: we lay blame on 
each other and then all feel guilty, while by the same stroke seeking, 
and granting ourselves, absolution (116). By linking our culture of guilt 
to a bourgeois goal of “une vie propre” (11), Clamence asserts Paris 
and Amsterdam as exemplars of this lifestyle of remorseful judges—
everyone there conforms to a desire for a clean and proper life by 
following the never-ending ritual of guilt, blame and absolution.
Although Clamence often seems to believe that he passes judg-
ments on others from a safe distance, he is not immune to what he 
criticizes. Like others in Paris and Amsterdam, he shows appreciation 
for cleanliness and purity, having chosen to live in the Jewish quarter 
that, as he says, was “cleaned” of Jews, and like others, he is full of 
blame and guilt. The historical events such as Nazism, collaboration 
and colonialism that Clamence evokes with an uneasy mix of depre-
cation and irony betray his anxieties and bring to the fore both his 
conscious choices and unconscious erasures of the past. By blaming 
himself, then justifying his behavior, only to make it clear that it 
cannot be forgiven, Clamence reveals that the cleansing of guilt is 
impossible because the logic of guilt and absolution reproduces it 
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endlessly. Perhaps the original title intended for La Chute—La Jugement 
dernier—would be more apt to underscore this point and bring the 
critical purpose of the story’s irony into sharper relief: although guilt 
is a form of remembering and repenting, it is essentially self-engaged. 
What Camus suggests in La Chute is that guilt and the monologic 
brooding over one’s guilt perpetuate the violence and self-involvement 
that have led to the unethical action.
Despite the fact that La Chute was originally conceived as part of 
L’Exil et le royaume, it was published separately both because of its 
essentially ironic nature and because the exile represented by Amster-
dam was not the kind of refuge that, in Camus’s imagination, led to 
freedom.14 Unlike La Chute, stories in L’Exil et le royaume have a less 
garrulous and more exhausted pace. Lacking the biting irony and the 
rambling preoccupation with the self caught in the temporal net of 
memory, history and guilt, these stories are stylistically more reserved, 
drawing attention to their slowness and weariness, and emphasizing 
spatial rather than temporal motifs. This slow and meditative rapport 
to the landscape in which one is exiled and which forms a bond com-
mon to those who are equally cast out in it is what Camus offers as an 
alternative to the failed exile of La Chute. In “L’Hôte,” for example, 
land is described as “l’étendue solitaire où rien ne rappelait l’homme” 
and where none of the inhabitants had any rights or advantages over 
others.15 Since “dans ce désert, personne, ni lui ni son hôte n’étaient 
rien; et pourtant, hors de ce désert, ni l’un ni l’autre n’auraient pu 
vivre vraiment” (113), the story proposes that both of its protago-
nists share the harshness of the land and that they should share it 
actively, as a form of revolt against the human condition advocated in 
L’Homme révolté. Seen within the context of Camus’s essayistic writings 
from the mid-fifties, the prominence of the land, together with the 
stylistic austerity, narrative slowness and emphasis on shame rather 
than guilt, promote Camus’s argument for a peaceful cohabitation of 
the various ethnic groups living in Algeria. As narrative devices, they 
are designed to minimize the drive for closure and representational 
definiteness that epitomizes political violence and in which literature 
inevitably participates. 
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Clearly enough, Camus’s appreciation for moral dilemmas and the 
shared land in L’Exil et le royaume is not without its problems. Francis 
Jeanson stressed Camus’s dubious disregard of the relevance of history 
for a theory of social justice already in the early fifties.16 The trying 
proposition of many of Camus’s works from the second half of that 
decade suggests that what unites Algerians is not the common history 
but the land on which they happen to be—or, as Le Premier Homme 
puts it, the fact that they are “sans racines.”17 After the numerous 
instances in which Edward Said and other postcolonial critics exposed 
the Western erasures of pre-colonial local histories, this is a provocative 
suggestion.18 While the stories in L’Exil et le royaume introduce impor-
tant ethical issues, what is politically problematic about their guiding 
principle of tolerance is that it circumvented the gravity of the struggle 
for Algerian independence. In order to justify the federalist mode 
of coexistence and the controversially all-inclusive understanding of 
Algerianness, Camus referred to the austere beauty of the land that 
elevates all who live there—Arabs, Berbers, the French, Italians, Turks, 
and Jews—above their ethnic and cultural differences.19 In some of the 
stories, Camus gets disturbingly close to the depiction of colonies as 
a source of ecstatic vastness, purifying passivity, and facile unanimity 
that has dominated Western portrayals of colonies for centuries. In 
“La Femme adultère,” for example, the protagonist Janine, a French 
woman living in Algeria alienated from other colonists and wishing 
to open herself to the foreign land, perceives the Algerian desert as a 
silent void without people. When she invokes the nomadic inhabitants 
of the desert, it is only as imaginary figures that suit her acute need 
to change her life, stop time and start living in the present moment, 
without having much to do with the actual place and people. Unlike 
D’Arrast from “La Pierre qui pousse” who makes an attempt to talk to 
the natives, showing preference for those who are less reverent of him 
than the local elites, and who in the end manages to win the sympathy 
of those who previously kept their distance from him, Janine remains 
locked in her private dream of freedom. In a way, she is not far from 
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Clamence, who wishes for a second chance but admits that keeping it 
only as a dream is easier because one does not have to actually enter 
the cold water or the inhospitable desert. 
But despite the fact that L’Exil et le royaume balances precariously on 
that convenient ignorance and self-serving Orientalism by which the 
West has so often related to the rest of the world, the land and the 
people in these stories never operate as mere vehicles for Europeans 
to deterritorialize themselves. While it is true that Janine perceives 
the Arabs and the nomads in a stereotypical fashion by focusing 
on their attire, gaze and pride, Camus draws our attention to these 
clichés instead of hiding them or simply reproducing them. Unlike 
Clamence, Janine shows a genuine, even if romanticized, admiration 
for the locals, repeatedly emphasizing her concern for her corpulence 
and dependency, wishing to shed both her weight and possessions 
and be more like the locals (33). However politically contentious, the 
ethical motivation of Camus’s focus on the land is unequivocal: the 
land in these stories functions as an ahistorical force that alleviates 
the dividing effects of history, religion and culture. Following Camus’s 
image of Algeria as “communautés aux personnalités différentes,”20 
the plainness of the Algerian land in L’Exil et le royaume is presented 
as a medium that brings the various peoples closer to each other, 
allowing them to see the otherness of others and accept it. Muteness 
and emptiness here are meant to connect rather than separate; or, 
as Maurice Blanchot notes, separate while showing that the men and 
the things separated communicate “au sein même de la séparation.”21 
Although the ethically complex situations unfold on the same barren 
stage in all stories in L’Exil et le royaume that take place in Algeria, they 
get the most manifest treatment in “L’Hôte,” a story that articulates 
most powerfully Camus’s emphasis on shame as an ethical and politi-
cal concept that promotes coexistence. 
In “L’Hôte,” a story about a French-Algerian schoolteacher’s ethi-
cal dilemma about whether to deliver an Arab criminal to prison or 
set him free, the theme of shame enters the scene inconspicuously, 
via the topoi of hospitality and fraternity. With the deliberate play on 
its title, “L’Hôte” depicts a situation in which it is unclear who the 
host and the guest are, and in which each of the three characters 
has to accommodate the other two despite their conflicting convic-
tions and allegiances. On the most obvious plane, Daru is the host, 
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and the Arab and Balducci (the gendarme who brings the Arab to 
Daru’s house) the guests, although both Balducci and the Arab are 
uneasy about their role as guests and Daru is equally troubled by his 
role of the host. At the same time, however, it is Daru, a pied noir, 
and Balducci, a Corsican, who are the guests. They are, as Jacques 
Derrida’s elegant phrase has it, “chez soi chez l’autre,” in the land to 
which the Arab has his own, and arguably more legitimate, rights.22 
The concrete historical situation here changes the polarized posi-
tion of the colonizer and the colonized—the position in which the 
colonizer is away from home but dominant and the colonized is at 
home but subordinate—into what Colin Davis has recently addressed 
as a situation in which one “is neither at home nor away from home 
(or is both), and is neither persuasively dominant nor genuinely 
subordinate.”23 This intricate interplay of identities and roles creates 
a discomfiting tension between hospitality and suspicion, fraternity 
and opposition, and kindness and anger that determines the way in 
which the events in the story unfold. 
When Balducci brings the Arab to Daru’s house, Daru invites them 
in without asking about the purpose of their visit, kneeling next to the 
detainee and offering him tea. Although the feeling of shame makes 
Daru untie the Arab, from the very beginning Daru’s hospitality is 
not effortless. After learning that the Arab killed his own cousin in a 
family squabble, Daru has to fight his anger and hesitation whether 
to offer him another cup of tea. Daru gets increasingly uneasy about 
the situation into which the Arab’s crime put him, refusing to have 
anything to do with Balducci’s orders to deliver the Arab to prison 
the next day. Mirroring the struggle to grant it, hospitality is equally 
difficult to accept. The Arab looks at Daru with the same mistrust-
ful gaze and cannot hide his surprise when Daru offers to eat with 
him. The same difficulty pertains to fraternity. Even though there is 
a sense of union between Daru and Balducci—revealed when Daru 
confirms that he would join Balducci and others in the suppression 
of the Arab revolt—Daru is reticent to Balducci’s evocations of duty 
and camaraderie. This simultaneous openness to and reserve about 
fraternity pertains to Daru’s relation with the Arab as well. While Daru 
has a fleeting experience of brotherhood with the Arab when they, like 
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“soldats ou prisonniers” (118), share the room at night—a sentiment 
echoed by the Arab who asks if Balducci will be taking him to prison 
and if Daru could go with them—he is mostly afraid and alert. As some 
other works from this time—“Terrorisme et répression,” for instance, 
which mentions a danger of fraternity,24 or La Chute, which refers ironi-
cally to “un grand sentiment de fraternité” (146)—“L’Hôte” is skeptical 
about all forms of fraternity under the present circumstances. And 
yet, in spite of putting both fraternity and hospitality into question, 
“L’Hôte” does not simply subvert them. The story redefines—or, as 
Eve Célia Morisi proposes, “de-ritualizes”—fraternity and hospitality, 
adapting them to the historical moment of ambiguous social roles 
and diasporic identities.25
Hospitality and fraternity, shame and honor, and ethics and politics 
all converge in the penultimate scene in which Daru brings the young 
Arab to the juncture and lets him choose between the path that leads 
to prison and the one that leads to the nomads in the desert. Even 
though Daru, following the rules of hospitality, provides the Arab with 
food and money in case he chooses the desert, his act is not without 
harshness, as he rebuffs at the Arab’s pleas for a talk and simply walks 
away. Here Daru, again, displays his difficulty in dealing with the 
demands of the situation, showing that he is far from exemplifying, 
as Elizabeth Hart believes, a decidedly ethical stance as opposed to 
Balducci’s unethical one.26 Fraternity in this scene is equally fickle. 
When after leaving the Arab, Daru turns and sees him staring back, 
he feels nauseous; and when he later finds him walking to prison, he 
realizes that although the political situation turns them both into exiles 
their commonality can never truly create a fraternal relation between 
the two of them. We do not know if the Arab chose prison in order to 
avoid Daru’s persecution by the French authorities for disobeying the 
order. But regardless of whether he, like Daru, did not want to curtail 
the other’s freedom, the outcome was precisely such. As the warning 
“‘Tu as livré notre frère. Tu paieras.’” (124), which Daru finds in his 
room upon his return, demonstrates, the conventional type of fraternity 
in the end gains the upper hand, with Daru facing retribution from 
the Arabs who think he delivered their brother to jail. 
Although Daru’s and the Arab’s decisions were determined by 
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ethical considerations, historical circumstances rendered them inef-
fective, as any decision was bound to be interpreted as either an 
act of treason by the French or a sign of colonial allegiance by the 
Arabs. Camus, however, is not merely opposing ethical and moral 
acts to politics, thereby giving voice to what Albert Memmi described 
as a “colonisateur de bonne volonté,” someone who points to the 
injustices of colonialism but is politically castrated and abandoned 
by both the colonizers and the colonized.27 Camus displays here his 
awareness that the questionable stance of neutrality represented in 
Daru’s refusal to take sides is not only politically ineffectual but also—
quite unexpectedly—ethically inconsequential. By drawing attention 
to Daru’s uneasiness about hosting the Arab and to his hopes that, as 
he imagined the Arab’s escape at night, he would be relieved of the 
burden of responsibility, the story never hides Daru’s search for an 
alibi. At the same time, however, it proposes that, in spite of Daru’s 
refusal to make the political choice of either delivering or releasing 
the Arab, his alibistic decision to give a choice was not a-political. 
Although Daru’s action did not represent a genuinely political act, it 
was political to the extent that giving the Arab a choice went against 
Daru’s obligation to bring him to prison. This non-choice thus did not 
exactly endorse the status quo by refraining from taking political sides. 
“L’Hôte” shows that even when the colonial situation dooms ethical 
acts to fail on the political level, such acts are necessary because they 
threaten the value system of a colonial society.28
In a situation when acts can be neither political nor ethical and yet 
are never without political and ethical motivations and consequences, 
shame, Camus suggests, can serve as a guiding principle of action. 
It is from the point of view of shame that Daru’s choice in “L’Hôte” 
appears as necessary. Had Daru acted differently, he would have 
betrayed either Balducci or the Arab, and would have been ashamed 
for doing so. Balducci’s and the Arab’s actions are determined by 
shame as well. All three characters constantly observe each other, 
pondering each other’s actions and, aware of the difficulty of the 
other’s position, often avert their gaze when their eyes meet. Shame 
here both allows for hospitality and fraternity, and undermines and 
redefines them. The logic of shame—its scopic nature that implies a 
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sense of an autonomous self exposed to the shaming gaze, a practice 
which is often associated with the Arabic culture and which “L’Hôte” 
extends onto all three characters regardless of their ethnicity—is 
not only staged in this story but also, like hospitality and fraternity, 
subjected to a de-ritualizing trial. As Pierre Bourdieu argued in Soci-
ologie de l’Algérie (1958), since in Algeria one’s actions are constantly 
subjected to the gaze of others, the resulting behavioral framework 
of shame and honor turns one’s autonomous self into a semblance 
of the self and thus into a being for others. Even though the three 
characters in “L’Hôte” share this behavioral paradigm and are there-
fore inextricably bound with each other, this story also shows that in 
a volatile milieu inhabited by ethnically diverse people with politically 
incongruent interests the communal dimension inherent to shame is 
not entirely unblemished.
While linking the characters together, shame in “L’Hôte” creates 
a difficult and essentially shattered whole. When Daru, for example, 
tells Balducci that he will not deliver the Arab to prison because it is 
“contraire à l’honneur” (120), Balducci admits that he too is some-
times ashamed of his behavior, as for instance when he brought the 
Arab tied up. Convinced that it nonetheless had to be done, Balducci 
appeals to his duty, something he believes he shares with Daru. For 
Daru, however, whatever communal dimension he and Balducci 
might have in common because of the imminent Arab revolt, it is 
not strong enough to make him disregard his sharp sense of shame. 
And yet, although Balducci’s evocation of fraternity did not fall on 
fertile ground with Daru, it nevertheless managed to preclude Daru 
from taking an easy way out by simply putting shame above fraternity. 
When Balducci suddenly leaves—after Daru acted insulted when asked 
to sign the delivery papers, considering it a matter of personal honor 
that he would, if need be, corroborate the receipt of the prisoner—
Daru suddenly feels ashamed of his rejection of Balducci’s advances 
of sociality. Paradoxically, Daru’s refusal of fraternity in the name of 
ethics has led to a bout of shame. We find similar instances of the 
way in which shame hampers the intersubjective bond while at the 
same time calling for it in Daru’s relationship with the Arab prisoner, 
as for example when they share the meal. What all these instances 
reveal is that despite its inability to deliver a decisively positive sense 
of community under the present circumstances, shame is the only 
principle capable of securing at least some form of cohesion and 
cohabitation.
In Camus, shame represents an intersubjective link endowed with an 
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ample ethical charge. In “L’Hôte”—unlike in La Chute, where shame 
leads to an aggressive imposition of social order, exemplified by the 
scene in which Clamence, after being punched by an angry motorist 
to the shaming gaze of onlookers, imagines beating him back, saving 
his face and, “moitié Cerdan, moitié de Gaulle” (59), ruling by power 
and respect—the attempt to keep one’s honor in the face of others 
implies respect for others rather than concern for self-recognition. 
Moreover, the spectatorial mechanism of shame, as Camus envisions 
it in this story, prescribes the kind of behavior that prevents everyone 
from experiencing shame. In other words, shame constitutes a col-
lective dimension—however fractured and composed of individuals 
with incompatible political beliefs—both because as a shared code 
of morality it makes each individual act so as to avoid experiencing 
shame, and because it forces each character to act so that his behavior 
does not put others in shame. The fact that someone else’s shame is 
often experienced as shameful also by those who witness it surfaces 
several times in “L’Hôte.” The importance of this fact for Camus’s 
evocation of shame as a regulative principle of one’s actions—and 
opposed to the use of shaming as an instrument of socially cleans-
ing violence—is illustrated by the prominence of an anecdote that 
appears in L’Étranger, Réflexions sur la guillotine and Le Premier Homme, 
and in which the father’s witnessing of the public execution leads to 
his feeling of shame, a result of participating in the collective act of 
shaming someone else. Similarly, in a crucial scene in Le Premier Homme, 
Jacques’s pride at winning the fight with Munoz turned into sadness 
when he, after seeing his crestfallen schoolmate, realized that “vaincre 
un homme est aussi amer que d’en être vaincu” (146).
In Camus’s narratives, shame functions as an ethical principle 
which, while bestowing personal identity by making one aware of 
oneself, is inseparable from dialogue and thus from the communal 
dimension. As E. L. Constable demonstrated, in Camus’s later work 
shame points to a “responsive ethics” instead of the solipsistic self-
interrogation typical of some of Camus’s early fiction.29 “L’Hôte” is 
exemplary in this regard. Shame in this story is a form of empathy 
and dialogic self-questioning rather than a simple appeal to emotions. 
We find similar examples in other stories in L’Exil et le royaume. In 
“Les Muets,” for example, the owner of a shop empathizes with the 
shame experienced by his workers when they have to return to work 
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after their unsuccessful strike, being himself ashamed that the bad 
financial situation of his shop prevents him from raising their salaries. 
Although the workers initially reject the owner’s attempt to ameliorate 
their feelings, they become later ashamed of their unresponsiveness. 
As in “L’Hôte,” also here the ethical disposition of shame implies a 
peculiar kind of humanism—in Camus’s fiction shame determines 
whether one is or is not a man, whether one is a part of a community 
or not. When in “L’Hôte” Balducci wants to expresses his respect for 
Daru, he only says, “tu es d’ici, tu es un homme” (111). In the same 
way, when Meursault is tried for murder in L’Étranger, Céleste, trying 
to maintain his honor in front of the shaming gaze of the audience, 
defends him by declaring that everyone knows he is “un homme,”30 a 
call reiterated in both Le Premier Homme where Jacques expresses his 
desire “à naître enfin comme homme” (181) and in La Peste where 
Rieux confesses that “ce qui m’intéresse, c’est d’être un homme.”31 
Shame, Camus suggests in his novels and stories, pertains to one’s 
deeds and the resulting emotions, as well as to who one is as a person 
and whether one belongs to humanity.
In the aftermath of the argument with Sartre and facing the out-
break of the Algerian war, Camus chose shame over guilt as the affect 
capable of alleviating the current crisis and doing justice to the ethi-
cal and political demands it raised. Unlike with guilt, which is rooted 
in the past and in internalized values, and which, as La Chute shows, 
can be rationalized, one cannot talk oneself out of shame. Shame is 
embedded in the gaze of the other and in the present moment, and 
since others cannot be disregarded when it comes to shame, it is not 
in the power of the self to overcome it. For Camus, shame pertains 
to how others see me, thus questioning, as Martha Nussbaum argued 
more recently, “the very being of the person who feels it.”32 Sartre, for 
his part, was not convinced of Camus’s argument against guilt and 
in favor of shame in spite of his belief that La Chute, with its scathing 
critique of guilt, was Camus’s best work. 
Although Sartre was aware that the identificatory logic of guilt 
implies the bond of complicity—and is thus problematic ethically (sug-
gesting that the victim and the perpetrator are interdependent) and 
politically (perpetuating violence through the dialectic of hatred)—
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guilt for him serves the important task of instigating political life. 
According to Sartre, guilt has to be cultivated because it stimulates 
action, as it did in his own case when it forced him to compensate 
both for his previous insufficient engagement (i.e., la Résistance) and 
for his identity (i.e., being a bourgeois rather than a worker, a writer 
rather than an activist). Camus, on the other hand, proposed dia-
logue, that is, a suspension of action. Even though both Sartre and 
Camus accused each other of the same political myopia caused by the 
abstractness of the ideal of justice the other promoted—in Camus’s 
case rooted in the idealistic and abstract understanding of revolt, and 
in Sartre’s in the ideologically fabricated ideal of the future—Camus 
believed that Sartre’s prototype of action was unacceptable because 
it justified injustices in the present in the name of the grand uncon-
ditional justice in the future. Politics, Camus suggested in his literary 
answers to Sartre, cannot serve as a vehicle for mollifying one’s guilty 
self, because guilt, like physical violence and the struggle for recog-
nition, is a dialectical trap and a self-perpetuating cycle. In Camus’s 
late fiction, this political plea for the suspension of action found its 
expression in the exhausted style and minimal forms. From La Chute 
to L’Exil et le royaume, Camus moved away from irony—which due to its 
“instability,” as Wayne Booth’s term indicates, triggers an endless chain 
of negations—toward the aesthetic of plainness, slowness and stylistic 
austerity that was designed to weaken the dialectic of violence.
Against guilt and the dynamic of its overcoming, Camus’s late nar-
ratives insist on the ethical significance of shame and on the political 
import of its socially cementing effect. The ethics and the politics 
these stories convey reveal that the two are inseparable. For Camus, 
shame always raises the question of who one is as related to others—
an observation that, as Bernard Williams illustrated in his acclaimed 
study, applies across both time and space.33 But as Camus’s stories show, 
shame never implies a facile communality in which differences are 
overcome or simply erased. At the historical moment of proliferating 
diasporic subjectivities, shame represented for Camus the possibility of 
coexistence that did not imply suppression of identities. In a difficult 
situation in which the social and the cultural roles become unstable, 
and in which one’s political allegiance based on ethnicity and nation-
hood turns equally problematic, shame preserves identity rather than 
suspends it. Unlike guilt and without moralism, shame affirms—as Eve 
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Kosofsky Sedgwick demonstrates in her recent revival of this notion for 
the subject of queer identities, and against the psychoanalytic emphasis 
on identity-formation as a regressive identification with the traumatic 
scene—the irreducibility of each identity in its difference from others.34 
Camus suggests that the exposure to the other’s gaze in shame both 
contests one’s identity and institutes it, all the while preventing this 
identity from being forcefully imposed onto others. Shame, in other 
words, offers a political model of interaction that acknowledges the 
singularity of identity without instigating the dialectic that confines 
it into a violent oppositionality.
Bilkent University
